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Meiklejohn: Public Speech and Libel Litigation: Are They Compatible?

SPEECH AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
PUBLIC SPEECH AND LIBEL LITIGATION:
ARE THEY COMPATIBLE?
Donald Meiklejohn*
"A lawsuit is a fruit tree planted in a lawyer's garden."
Italian Proverb
"A lawsuit is a good experience."
Alan Abelson, columnist
and editor of Barron's
Weekly, on the third
libel suit brought
against him in five
years.'
I.

LIBEL LITIGATION: THE PROBLEM

At the meeting of the American Bar Association in July of

1985, Dick Cunningham, associate professor of journalism at New
York University, argued that, in libel cases, procedures other than
litigation are needed. 2 He conceded that although such changes are
unlikely, a resort to arbitration might be possible. In contrast, Bruce
Sanford, a noted authority on libel, asserted that the unsettled state
of libel law makes any alternative to litigation unlikely, since it is
unrealistic to believe that attorneys will not resort to litigation. 3
The impact of libel litigation on public discussion has been considerable: It has been characterized as leading to censorship of the
* Professor Emeritus, Philosophy and Social Science, Syracuse University. A.B., Univer-

sity of Wisconsin, 1930; Ph.D., Harvard University, 1936.
1. Jakobson, Barron's Bad Boy, 20 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 13, 14 (Jan.-Feb. 1984).
2.
3.

54 U.S.L.W. 2057 (July 23, 1985).
Id.
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press by libel lawyers. Various remedies have been proposed, including the award of attorney's fees in suits determined to be frivolous.,
There have been such awards in cases where the court has found
genuine frivolity or bad faith, 6 but how far such a practice may be
encouraged in libel cases heard by the present Supreme Court is
open to question.
The following discussion argues for an absolute privilege for all
comment on public affairs." This thesis is based upon the concurring
opinions of Justices Black, Goldberg, and Douglas in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,9 in which they asserted that the absolute
privilege affirmed for statements by public officials 0 should be
matched by a comparable privilege for the public on matters of public concern."'
The libel litigations involving Generals Sharon12 and Westmore4. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 424-25 (1975)
(noting that the primary concern of the press has shifted from whether material is libelous to
whether the subject will sue).
5. See Jones, A Newspaper To Seek Fees In Libel Cases, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, at
A39, col. 6. For a discussion of frivolous litigation and the award of attorney's fees, see Wade,
On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and ProceduralSanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 433 (1986).
6. See Berger, Ruling Backs Penalties in Groundless Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, May 22,
1985, at B2, col. 5.
7. Cf. the unsuccessful attempt of Chief Justice Burger to persuade the Court's majority to adopt stricter penalties for frivolous appeals to the Court. Greenhouse, Supreme Court
Roundup-Justices to Decide Case on Redrawing Districts, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1985, at
A17, col. 2.
8. The position taken here attempts to complement a number of my earlier discussions
advancing a "public speech" theory of the first amendment with particular reference to New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the
First Amendment, 55 GEo. LJ. 234 (1966) (advancing the "public speech theory" of first
amendment interpretation and arguing for absolute free speech on public issues); Meiklejohn,
Public Speech in the Supreme Court Since New York Times v. Sullivan, 26 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 819 (1975) (advocating the public speech theory of first amendment interpretation as the
best perspective to determine the scope of first amendment freedoms); Meiklejohn, Public
Speech in the Burger Court: The Influence of Mr. Justice Black, 8 U. TOL L. REV. 301
(1977) (discussing the reluctance of the Burger Court to adopt Justice Black's interpretation
of the first amendment as a vehicle for encouraging responsible and responsive public
discussion).
9. 376 U.S. 254, 293, 297 (1964) (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring, and
Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring in result).
10. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 574 (1964).
II. 376 U.S. at 298 (Justice Goldberg stating, "In my view, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution afford to the citizen and to the press an absolute, unconditional privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow from excesses and
abuses.").
12. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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land' 3 are recent notable cases in a well-traced history 4 that began
with the Times v. Sullivan decision in 1964. The Times v. Sullivan
decision was based on a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."' 5 To further hat commitment, the Court developed the Times
v. Sullivan standard, that a public official be prohibited from "recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."' 16
As summarized by the late Harry Kalven, Jr., of the University
of Chicago, the Times v. Sullivan decision "involved a rare instance
of measuring the common law of defamation by constitutional standards."'17 The Court was forced "back to the discovery of a basic
truth about the First Amendment, namely that the core of its constitutional protection must be to guard against treating seditious libel
as an offense."' 8 As Kalven had said for himself earlier, "A free
society is one in which you cannot defame the government."' 9
A recent comment by Judge Irving Kaufman brings the history
to its present posture. Taking note of the flood tide of libel proceedings and the heavy damages awarded, Judge Kaufman concludes
with regret that the promise of the Times v. Sullivan decision has
not been fulfilled.2 0 The elasticity of the test of actual malice, the
13.
14.

Westmoreland v. CBS Inc., 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
See Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986) (opinion of Justice

O'Connor, which provides a comprehensive historical overview of the legal developments in the
area of protected speech).

15.
16.

376 U.S. at 270.
Id. at 279-80.

17. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 191.
18. H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 59 (1965).

19. Id. at 16. Kalven analyzed with'thoroughness and characteristic felicity the arguments of Justice Brennan's opinion and the concurring opinions of Justices Black and
Goldberg. He noted that all members of the Court accepted the analogy between the expression of a citizen-critic and the utterances of a public official. Given this analogy, he thought,

Justice Brennan might have joined Black, Goldberg, and Douglas in affirming absolute protection for comments on public affairs. It is not quite clear whether Kalven approved the restric-

tion advanced by Justice Brennan in terms of actual malice. Kalven did, however, express his
enthusiasm for Justice Brennan's formulation of the theme of self-government as the basis for
freedom of discussion. Id. at 52-64.

20. See Kaufman, The Media and Juries, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at A27, col. 2.
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responsiveness of juries to bias against unpopular defendants, and a
growing animosity against the press have resulted in a series of
awards which have 21made the well-financed press cautious and the
smaller press silent.
The issue considered here is broader than a simple struggle over
the rights of the press. Recent libel proceedings have involved such
nonpress defendants as a civil rights group protesting a town council
dismissal of a black secretary, civic associations combining to resist a
development project, a farmer sued by a toxic waste disposal company, and a group of mayoral candidates charged with defamation
by another, unsuccessful candidate.22 In June of 1985, the Supreme
Court unanimously denied absolute immunity of petition claimed by
the author of a letter which had challenged the qualifications of a
candidate for a position as a United States Attorney. 23 It is estimated that similar libel suits involving nonmedia defendants numbered a few hundred a year in the 1970's but are now approaching a
thousand a year or even more.24 The same constitutional issues are
involved in these cases as in those concerning the print or broadcast
media.
Some commentators have endorsed the bringing of such libel
suits against private individuals who allegedly lack a sense of public
responsibility.2 5 The central theme of the Times v. Sullivan decision,
however, was that we must expect public discussion, when it is uninLike Professor Kalven, Judge Kaufman does not affirm the Black position of absolute protection, since he believes that it would close off access to some deserving plaintiffs. But he indicates his belief that some change is necessary if public deliberation on public issues is to be
genuinely free.
21. Id. Judge Kaufman cited a study by the Libel Defense Resource Center, a private
information clearing house for the media:
[O]ut of a sample of 54 defamation and invasion-of-privacy cases brought against
the media since 1978, the defendants were ordered to pay damages in 47. Thirty of
these awards totaled more than $100,000, 12 exceeded $250,000, and 9 went beyond $1 million. Punitive damages ... were assessed in 30 cases, with 17 of these
awards exceeding $250,000, and seven for $1 million or more.
Id.
22. Greenhouse, Outspoken Private Critics of Officials Increasingly Face Slander Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1985, at BI 1, col. 1.
23, McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985). The court in McDonald held that the
petition clause of the first amendment is subject to the same restrictions as other first amendment freedoms. Thus, a petitioner may be subject to liability for libel. Greater constitutional
protection is not afforded to petitions to the President. Id. at 485.
24. See Greenhouse, supra note 22.
25, See Reagan Science Adviser Says Press Seeks to Demolish U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb.
23, 1985, at A47, col. 2, where the President's Science Adviser, George A. Keyworth, asserted
that "the press is trying to tear down America."
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hibited, to be robust and on occasion intemperate.26 Society has
more to fear from inertia and apathy in public affairs than it does
from the free expression of strongly held opinions. Americans have
never proposed to live in a society in which the bland lead the bland.
We expect deep differences of opinion and we thrive on them. Certainly the issues which have given rise to the recent libel suits
against nonmedia defendants - civil rights, pollution, political rivalry - are important issues which call for comment.
Adoption of the position that all comment on public affairs
should be absolutely privileged would simplify much of the current
litigation. Some significant questions, however, must first be answered. Formulation of the privilege requires a clear definition of
"public affairs," and an accurate determination of the role of
"truth" and "falsity" in public discussion.
II.

WHAT IS "PUBLIC"?

Justice Goldberg, in his Times v. Sullivan opinion, noted the
importance of defining the limits of "public." He disclaimed any intention of extending the absolute privilege of comment to purely private libels. 27 The Court, as a whole, has had great difficulty in defining the concept of "public" beyond attributing to it all conduct by
public officials in the discharge of their official duties. 28 The standard
developed was that of the "public figure." In order to qualify for
constitutional protection, a public figure must be the object of the
speech in question. 29 Later, the protection was extended to include
comment on subjects of public or general interest. 30 In Rosenbloom
26. 376 U.S. at 270.
27. 376 U.S. at 302 n.4 (Goldberg, J.,concurring in result).
28. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (Senator Proxmire's publication
of his Golden Fleece awards was declared not part of his official duties).
29. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (involving a retired general who was active in civil rights agitation and who had attained some political prominence;
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (involving the athletic director/ex-football
coach of a major university); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (involving the invasion of
a private home by convicts); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (involving the operator of
a public recreation area). In Time, Inc. v. Hill, a minority of the Court contended that the
plaintiff had been involuntarily brought into public attention by the press after he and his
family had tried strenuously to escape public notice. To this the majority, through Justice
Brennan, replied, in effect, that what the press finds to be of public concern is, by that token,
of public concern and newsworthy. Id. at 388-89.
30. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (Justice Brennan wrote for
himself and Justices Burger and Blackmun; Justices Black and White concurred separately;
Justices Harlan, Marshall and Stewart dissented; Justice Douglas took no part).
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v. Metromedia, Inc.,31 the Court mustered a bare majority to support this extension. Justice Marshall joined other dissenters in finding the plaintiff to be a private-person even though he had been arrested on a charge of distributing obscene materials. a2 The case
highlighted the problem of identifying the public aspect in the activity of a person previously unnoticed by the press.
Since Rosenbloom, the Court has moved away from its expansion of the area of protected comment. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,33 the majority, in an opinion by Justice Powell, declared that
the plaintiff was not a public figure although he was a well-known
lawyer who had been criticized in the defendant's magazine, American Opinion, for his part in the murder prosecution of a Chicago
policeman.34 The magazine had accused Gertz of being part of a
Communist conspiracy to discredit the police.3 5 In affirming Gertz's
private status, the Court declared that the standard for establishing
libel should not be actual malice as defined in Times v. Sullivan, but
rather negligence as the state might define it.3
Two years later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone,3 the Court continued to narrow the area in which comment was to be protected under
the "actual malice" rule. A majority of the Court held that the respondent, whose seventeen-month litigation for divorce was the subject of a Time magazine report, was not a public figure, despite her
visibility in Palm Beach society and the fact that the case was widely
reported.3 8 Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from this denial
of public status. Brennan reviewed the rulings since Times v. Sullivan and stressed that "[a]t stake

. . .

is the ability of the press to

report to the citizenry the events transpiring in the Nation's judicial
systems."39 Marshall argued that, given the respondent's prominence
in Palm Beach society, her subscription to a clipping service, and the
press interviews she held during the trial, she qualified as a public
figure.40
31. Id.
32. Id. at 78.

33. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
34. Id. at 352.
35. Id. at 325-26.
36. Id. at 347.
37. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
38. Id. at 455.
39. Id. at 476 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
40. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Marshall did indeed go on to contend that in
Gertz the Court had agreed with his assertion (in his Rosenbloom dissent) that a criterion as
broad as "information ...relevant to self-government" is not suitable as a basis for decision.
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Since 1976, state and federal courts have struggled with the
concept of "public" and have emerged with a variety of meanings. 41
The time is ripe to reconsider the rationale which was first set forth
in Times v. Sullivan and which has been obscured by the debate
over "public figure." As Justice Black, in his later years, reflected on
the course of the Court's libel decisions, he asserted that "the Court
is getting itself in the same quagmire in the field of libel in which it
is now helplessly struggling in the field of obscenity. No one, including this Court, can know what is and what is not constitutionally
obscene or libelous under this Court's rulings. "42
The essence of the Times v. Sullivan rationale was the necessity
for uninhibited debate about public affairs and matters of public
concern. 43 The fact that the plaintiff was a public official led the
Court to formulate its principle of press protection in terms of the
relationship between the public and its agents. 4 ' In the cases which
followed, it became clear that the relationship had to be more
broadly conceived, though some members of the Court have resisted
this,' 5 so that protection was to be accorded, absent actual malice, to
persons, official or not, involved in matters of public concern. Hence,
the public figure appeared in the persons of the Hill family, 46 General Walker,'4 and Wally Butts.'8 Subsequently, when Rosenbloom
was decided, the Court considered the public nature of the controversy rather than that of the individual to be crucial. 49 The refusal to
50
acknowledge this distinction led the Court to its decision in Gertz.
The dissents of Brennan and Marshall in Firestone exemplify
the two approaches. Brennan based his argument on the fact that
Time was reporting a trial and the divorce judgment which issued
from it.5 1 Marshall, responding to the Court's majority more diSuch a criterion is too indeterminate, he thought, to be left to the "conscience of judges";
rather the Court should focus on the status or actions of the individuals involved. Id. at 488.

41.

See, e.g., Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr.

206 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
42. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 171 (1967).
43. 376 U.S. at 270.
44. Id. at 279-80.

45. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 411 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 387-88.

47. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
48.

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

49. 403 U.S. at 43 (Justice Brennan stating, "The public's primary interest is in the
event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and signifi-

cance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.").
50.
51.

418 U.S. at 352.
424 U.S. at 473-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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rectly, stressed the public character of the respondent. 52 The Brennan argument, which focused on the nature of the controversy, was
more directly responsive to the first amendment. The freedoms of
speech and press are not primarily concerned with individuals, either
as speakers or writers, or as the objects of comment. The first
amendment freedoms have to do with the exercise of public opinion
regarding matters of public concern, and the response to that exercise. First amendment freedoms do not consist of the ability to say or
write anything, anywhere, anytime, but rather consist of our ability
to comment freely on matters that are of concern to the public.
When we praise or criticize individuals who are involved in matters
of public concern, our comment is only incidentally "personal." It is
essentially a reflection on the quality of the public action in which
they are taking part. As Justice Brennan stressed in Rosenbloom,
the Times v. Sullivan privilege is applicable "to all discussion and
communication involving matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons involved are famous or
53
anonymous.
The recent case of a Consumers Union report about the loudspeaker system developed by Dr. Bose illustrates and confirms the
distinction between public conduct and the conduct of individuals.54
While anyone connected with the communications industry may
achieve considerable notoriety, it can hardly be said that Dr. Bose's
name is a "household word." On the basis of the language used in
the lower courts, Dr. Bose would be called a "qualified" or "limited"
public figure rather than a "general purpose" public figure. 55 One
can imagine Justice Black's skepticism concerning such distinctions
and his insistence that it is the public concern that is crucial. The
freedom to comment needs protection in commercial as well as in
narrowly "political" matters when it is relevant to the public's ability
to make up its mind. 56 The process of public deliberation, whether or
52. Id. at 485 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), where a reporter was sued for broadcasting the name of a deceased rape

victim, in violation of a state privacy statute. The Court held in favor of the defendant reporter, however, because the victim's name was available on the public judicial records which
the defendant utilized. Id. at 496.
53. 403 U.S. at 44.
54. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). For
a thorough discussion of Bose, see Brannigan & Ensor, Did Bose Speak Too Softly?: Product
Critiques and the First Amendment, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571 (1986).
55. Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509 (1986).

56. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (first and fourteenth amendment protections of public speech may
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not it results in public action such as legislation, requires that all
relevant information be available.
The definition of the public deliberation which requires protection has been delineated by Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,57 the
classic text for libel actions in the constitutional framework. In that
case, the Court declared that "the libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting' words" fall outside the scope of first amendment protection. 5 Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, called the town marshal a
"God damned racketeer" and "damned fascist" while being arrested
for provoking a disturbance.59 In retrospect it seems a pity that no
member of the Court, not even Justice Black, pointed out the distinction between Chaplinsky's comment on the conduct of public affairs
and his "picking a fight" with the marshal. Chaplinsky may well
have been guilty of the latter, but the former surely would have been
protected as a contribution, however unpopular in war-time, to public discussion. 0
In an attempt to define what constitutes public discussion, the
Court has also drawn a distinction between "ideas" and "facts." In
Gertz, Justice Powell wrote that "[u]nder the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea," 61 implying that all ideas are
matters of opinion and therefore not relevant to the determination of
actual malice. Facts, on the other hand, may be known and statements about them are susceptible of truth or falsity. But serious political discussion is almost always about "facts-in-theories." The
John Birch Society's charge that Elmer Gertz was a member of a
Communist conspiracy to discredit the police involved both theory
and fact. This charge was intended to influence public opinion re62
specting the activity of alleged Communists in the United States.
Any and all reports about court proceedings, as in Firestone,6 3 are
likewise a mixture of theory and fact.
First amendment protection must extend to all statements of
extend to advertising).
57. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
58. Id. at 572.
59. Id. at 569-70.
60. See Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37
N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 558 (1962), where Justice Black commented on the aphorism about
falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theater: "If a person creates a disorder in a theater they
would get him there not because of what he hollered, but because he hollered."
61. 418 U.S. at 339.
62. Id. at 325.
63. 424 U.S. at 452.
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fact which are of general, public importance. The crucial consideration is the assertion's relevance to the formation of public opinion.
Rather than invoking the "idea-fact" distinction, courts should employ the conception formulated by Judge Kaufman in Edwards v.
National Audubon Society, Inc.,64 in which the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a $61,000 libel judgment against the New
York Times. Judge Kaufman wrote that "a democracy cannot long
survive unless the people are provided the information needed to
form judgments on issues that affect their ability to intelligently govern themselves. 0 5 The public needs information, regardless of the
form or the source, to make important decisions. Of course, one who
advances a general idea believes it is based upon actual experience,
but as the idea is made public, its significance lies in its potential
influence on public policy. The idea's validity as a basis for such
policy is for individuals or legislators, not courts, to determine. In
sum, public is that which the media or other groups or persons make
public, i.e., "publish." If this challenges the common law tradition of
defamation, so be it. For insofar as that tradition punishes written
comments, it interferes with the process by which the public makes
up its mind, and, indeed, is generated and maintained. It is not possible, a priori, to denote the precise range of "public affairs." Public
opinion is what determines the focus of what the public undertakes
as policy at any given time. To interpose the hurdle of a libel suit
between public opinion and public action is to handicap the process
of self-government.
Are there, then, any publications or other written comments
which deal with purely private affairs? Justice Goldberg's note in
Times v. Sullivan indicates that a gray area exists between public
and private conduct, and that the public-private distinction is not as
intractable as that between a "malicious" and a "non-malicious"
state of mind.67 Letters of recommendation for employees or for students are normally private communications,"8 yet employment and
teaching relationships may be publicly significant in certain contexts.
Comment on Carol Burnett's dinner in a Washington restaurant
64.

556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977).

65. Id. at 115.
66.

See J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 33-34 (1954) (stating that as a result

of our constantly changing social environment, the range of public affairs fluctuates).
67. 376 U.S. at 302 n.4 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Cf. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 48
(Justice Brennan stating that "some aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall
outside the area of matters of public or general concern").
68.

Cf.Z. CHAFEE, I GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 83 (1947).
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might appear to provide an instance of purely private communication, despite her national prominence.69 What and where a person
eats is presumably her own business, even if she is a "public figure."
Yet, when the National Enquirer published a gossip item, which it
later conceded to be false, that Burnett was drunk at the restaurant,
the report clearly had import for her dedicated activities against alcoholism. The remedy which the public and Carol Burnett need is
not a pecuniary penalty, but rather the issuance of a retraction
which would be more influential than the "correction" which the National Enquirer actually published. Alternatively, the Enquirer
might have made space available for a fully adequate reply by Carol
Burnett. In sum, the report about her evening out did in fact affect
public interest on an important public issue in which she is vitally
concerned. The central question that her libel remedy should address
is that of her effectiveness as an advocate against alcoholism.70
Another example of conduct which might be considered to fall
entirely in the private sphere is commercial activity involving only
private participants. In Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,"5 the adverse credit rating of a firm was circulated confidentially only to a limited set of subscribers. In light of its decision
that the statements did not involve matters of public concern, the
Vermont Supreme Court affirmed an award of $50,000 compensatory and $300,000 punitive damages for a concededly false report of
bankruptcy.72 The Vermont Supreme Court, taking note of the
United States Supreme Court's silence on the issue, asserted that the
Times v. Sullivan privilege does not extend to nonmedia publishers, 73 adding, "Our common law has never recognized a qualified
privilege against defamation actions for credit reporting
agencies ...

"7

The Vermont decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court,75 but only by a divided majority: Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor concurred with Justice Powell's opinion, and two
other Justices concurred separately. Contrary to Justice Powell's
69. Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d. 991, 997, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206,
208 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
70. For a thoughtful discussion of the public-private distinction, see F. HAIMAN, SPEECH
AND LAW IN A FREE SocIETY 68-86 (1981).
71. 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414 (1983).
72. Id. at 76, 461 A.2d at 420-21.
73. Id. at 75, 461 A.2d at 417-18.
74. Id. at 76, 461 A.2d at 419.
75. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).
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contention that the credit rating was a private communication, 6 Justice Brennan, for himself and Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, declared that "[t]he credit reporting of Dun & Bradstreet falls
within any reasonable definition of 'public concern' consistent with
our precedents." 7 Justice Brennan cited the dissent of Justice Douglas in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove 8 to the effect that particular
financial data "are part of the fabric of national commercial
communication." 79
Publication respecting commercial activity has been explicitly
affirmed by the Supreme Court to be protected under the first
amendment. Advertising of job opportunities,"0 the operation of an
abortion clinic,"" the prices of prescription drugs, 2 and professional
legal services 3 have all been declared to be forms of public expression conveying what the public needs to know. It is not primarily the
individual interests of consumers that these publications serve, but
rather the concern of the public as a whole, which conceivably may
affect legislation. The availability of such information in terms independent of special commercial and professional interests is what the
public needs, especially in a period of technologically refined manufacture and service. If Ralph Nader is to be free to rate commercial
products, so should those who work to sell them.
III. TRUTH-FALSITY: THE TEST OF ACTUAL MALICE
The Times v. Sullivan decision challenged the traditional law of
defamation, not only in bringing public affairs to the center of consideration, but also by sharply limiting the reach of falsehood as a
basis for a libel judgment. From that case and its progeny there has
developed the now familiar test of "actual malice" 84 - publication
of a defamatory falsehood or reckless disregard for truth or falsity.
It was that test which Justices Black, Goldberg, and Douglas re76. Id. at 762.
77.
78.
79.
(1971)).
80.
(1973).
81.
82.

Id. at 789.
404 U.S. 898 (1971).
472 U.S. 749, 791 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 906
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425

U.S. 748 (1976).
83. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
84. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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jected in Times v. Sullivan and the cases which followed. 5 They
maintained that the test of actual malice would not, in the hands of
emotional juries and judges, afford real protection to a genuinely independent press.
The strongest argument for the test of actual malice has been
set forth by Justice Brennan, in whose opinions and dissents the test
has been very narrowly defined.8 6 With all deference to his gallant
concern for the freedom of public discussion, it seems that his logic
is incomplete. Attention to individuals has, on occasion, appeared to
divert his reasoning from the needs of the public as a whole."
The double criterion of deliberate falsehood and reckless disregard for truth or falsity focuses on the intentions of the speaker or
writer; the important question, however, is the content of what was
said or written. According to the tradition of common law libel, the
question is whether the publisher, reporter, or author is trying to
hurt another person by damaging his reputation.88 In first amendment cases, however, that is not determinative. Rather, what must
be asked is: Does this expression provide information relevant to the
process of the public's self-government in the face of "the exigencies
of their period"? 89 The argument that the deliberate lie or the negligent or reckless report corrupts public discussion9" rests upon a confusion between the state of mind of the writer or speaker and the
objective situation written about. Indeed, for all we know, a deliberate liar may hit the truth in spite of himself, and a reckless gossip
may throw unintended light on an area of popular interest. 9' They
may often do otherwise. But the first amendment's premise is that
the public is able to receive and appraise the reporting of a genuinely
free press. The amendment does not limit its protection to good peo85. 376 U.S. at 293 (Black and Douglas, J.J., dissenting), 297-98 (Goldberg and Douglas, J.J., dissenting).
86. See supra note 29 for the series of cases identified as the "progeny" of Times v.
Sullivan.
87. But cf. Brennan's dissent in Greenmoss: "The inherent worth of ... speech in terms

of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source .... "
Greenmoss, 472 U.S. at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.

Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
88. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1560 (1986).
89. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940), where the Court stated: "The
exigencies of the colonial period and the efforts to secure freedom from oppressive administration developed a broadened conception of these liberties as adequate to supply the public need

for information and education with respect to the significant issues of the times."
90. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).

91. See J.S.

MILL, ON LIBERTY

44-52 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
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pie, honest people, or careful people. All Americans may contribute,
as they see fit, to the formation of public opinion.
The attempt to exclude the deliberately false or reckless statement from first amendment protection harks back to the concept of
seditious libel which Times v. Sullivan has generally been understood to have rejected.92 That concept rested on the notion that there
are bad people who are against the government and who would upset
it by stirring discontent among the good people of the country. Criticism of the government was interpreted as evidence of a lack of patriotism.9 3 But we have long since come to believe (with some regrettable lapses) that criticism of government is a patriotic duty, that the
tendency of every government is to assume its own virtue, and that
the role of the press, as well as of academics and of citizens at large,
is to keep government under incessant scrutiny.
When a libel controversy is explicitly focused on public affairs,
questions of truth and falsity are secondary. While the expression of
a given opinion about a public issue may be deeply harmful to the
public, the remedy inherent in the first amendment is more expression. 94 Adverse comments about so-called public figures, as well as
public officials, reflect genuine perspectives on the policies and ideas
those people represent. To speak of the truth or falsity of such ideas
makes no sense. What does make sense is to examine the adverse
comments in the context of the infinitely varied complex of political
and social views that make up the public opinion of the United
States.
Judge Kaufman and other judicial authorities on the first
amendment advise us that on occasion we must tolerate some abuses
of free speech in order to enjoy its blessings.9 5 For many decades the
group most widely thought to lie about American society has been
the Communist Party. Yet in time the courts have come to distinguish between radical words and radical actions and to accord to the
former the protections of the first amendment.98 The "falsehood" of
which Communists and other radicals are said to be the authors is
simply their unpopular conception of who we are and how we are
92. See H. KALVEN, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 25.
94. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927).
95. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soe'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
96. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957).
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doing. Even General Westmoreland's suit against CBS ultimately
amounted to a claim that 60 Minutes had improperly depicted one
phase of the Vietnam campaign. 97 To submit to a jury trial the question of whether CBS deliberately lied is to invite jury and judge to
take sides on a deeply controversial public issue. The really serious
charge that might have been brought against CBS is that the program did not give the General a fair chance to present his side of the
case.
The development of the test of actual malice is, in some ways,
similar to that of the test of clear and present danger. 8 The latter
test, first formulated by a judge regarded as especially partial to free
speech claims, 99 was, in its early years, often construed rather
loosely.100 In the later days of the Warren Court, clear and present
danger came to be construed with such strictness that it virtually
disappeared.101 It has not, however, been explicitly discarded by the
Court and may be available for further interpretation as the Court
changes. Similarly, actual malice in its early formulation clearly provided a basis for imposing first amendment restrictions on libel law,
and it was expanded for a decade to protect a widening area of public discussion. 10 2 Since 1974, the Court has steadily contracted the
protections afforded under the test.103 As this present trend is contemplated, it seems appropriate to recall Justice Black's wistful con10 4
clusion to his dissent in Dennis v. United States:
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction
of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that in
calmer times, when present pressures, passions and fears subside,
this or some later Court will restore the First Amendment liberties
97. Westmoreland v. CBS Inc., 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
98. The "clear and present danger" test was first formulated by Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.").
99. In a letter to Sir Frederick Pollock, Holmes stated that the Chief Justice had assigned him the writing of the opinion in a later free speech case, Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919), because he would "go farther" than the majority in his support for free
speech. 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 7 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
100. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 671 (1925).
101. See cases cited supra note 96.
102. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
103. This trend began with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
104. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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to the high preferred place where they belong in a free society. 105
Justice Black might have found some comfort in the recent
treatment of the truth-falsity issue in PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps.106 A majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice O'Connor, declared that the plaintiffs must bear the burden
of proving falsity; the four dissenters contended that the defendants
should bear the burden of proving truth. 107 Justices Brennan and
Blackmun, concurring, asserted that the Court's rule should apply to
nonmedia defendants as well as media defendants. 108 The crux of the
Court's opinion was that "[tlo ensure that true speech on matters of
public concern is not deterred, we hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public
concern. '"109 In effect, this grants the publisher a presumption of
truthfulness on public issues. When the media speak to a public issue, the public should listen, and evaluate it for themselves. This
opinion does not appear "pernicious," as claimed by the dissenters, 110
nor indifferent to concerns for reputation. Plaintiffs are left with a
possible recourse of direct refutation. But the more substantial recourse is to be found in the public's appraisal of the challenged
statement.
IV.

ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES

Assuring an absolute privilege for comment on public
need not leave deserving plaintiffs entirely without remedy.
comments on Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.,1 1
Kaufman explained his disagreement with Justices Black and

affairs
In his
Judge
Doug-

las by saying that "an absolute prohibition . . . necessarily leaves

some individuals who have suffered real injury without legal recourse
against a press that does not always exercise its responsibilities
wisely.1 112 In recent decades, however, there have been a number of
proposals for providing alternative remedies to the public figure or
official who has been the aggrieved subject of adverse comment.
105. Id. at 581.
106.

106 S. Ct. 1558, 1561-67 (1986).

107. Id. at 1566.
108. Id. at 1565-66.
109. Id. at 1564.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1566.
556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
Kaufman, supra note 20, at A27, col. 4. See also text accompanying supra note 20.
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Such responses to Judge Kaufman's challenge113include voluntary or
mandatory retraction, and the right to reply.
The remedy of mandatory retraction was advocated by New
York Times columnist Anthony Lewis at the end of the SharonTime trial.1 14 Although Lewis believes that the trial should not have
taken place at all, he has not generalized that view into the BlackDouglas absolute privilege position. Rather, he believes, like Justice
Brennan, that such an absolute view disregards the legitimate concern for reputation.115 Lewis would modify current libel trial procedure in order to reduce its cost; he estimates that Time and General
Sharon together spent over $3 million in legal fees, not to speak of
the impact of the two-month trial on the litigants and the federal
court system. Accordingly, he proposes that such libel litigation
should be replaced by an action to challenge the truth of the allegedly defamatory publication. No damages would be awarded or
questions raised about the state of mind of the authors of the publication. If the plaintiff proved the publication false, the defendant
would have to pay reasonable counsel fees and publish a retraction.
Thus, the demands of both reputation and public information would
be fairly met."l6
Though retraction of factual statements conceded to be false
would provide a measure of relief, the validity of the publication remains a matter unsuitable for resolution in a legal proceeding. The
significance of the Westmoreland and Sharon trials was not that one
side or the other was "right about the facts" or that one side had to
retract. In fact, all parties claimed victory. To some extent, as in
both of these cases, a publication may concede error. But such concessions still leave the court, confronted by the conflicting presentations, with the task of making up its mind. A libel court, acting by
113. See Note, Vindication of the Reputation ofpa Public Official, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1730, 1734-49 (1967); Abrams, Why We Should Change the Libel Law, N.Y. Times, Sept.
29, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 34.
114. Lewis, After Sharon, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1985, at A23, col. I.
115. Assertion of an absolute privilege or of an absolute right to expression is often
caricatured to, imply irresponsibility. Yet there are many accepted absolutes prescribed in the
Constitution, notably those belonging to members of Congress. Members of the judiciary and
of the executive branch generally are privileged in respect to what they say in the course of
their official activities.
116. 'See Lewis, supra note 114. It may be contended that the outcome of the SharonTime trial resembled that envisioned by Lewis, in that Time, in fact, conceded error with
respect to a crucial document while still affirming the general validity of its report. On the
other hand, costs to both sides were very heavy even though, in the absence of a finding of
actual malice, no monetary damages were awarded.
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itself, is not the proper forum for the resolution of these basic differences on public policy.
More promising than the retraction remedy is that proposed by
Zechariah Chafee in Government and Mass Communications."' In
that book, published seventeen years before the Times v. Sullivan
decision, Chafee developed an argument for introducing "An American Statute Embodying the Right of Reply."' 1 8 Writing as a member of the Commission on Freedom of the Press, 119 Chafee argued
that such a statute could be a basis for meeting many of the
problems of libel litigation in the United States.
Chafee would not have accepted an absolute prohibition of libel
proceedings in cases involving public affairs; characteristically, he
balanced his concern for informing the public with his concern for
protecting reputation.1 20 In both public and private matters, however, he found two great merits in the right of reply - it is "cheap,
expeditious, and convenient, 1 21 and it "presents only simple issues
for decision. ' 22 Conversely, he conceded that "the right of reply is
open to at least three objections:"123 the right may impose serious
burdens on the press and on judges; a defendant publisher may
match a reply with another story even more objectionable than the
original; and the introduction of a new statutory procedure might
disturb existing mitigatory procedures such as the publication of voluntary retractions. 124 Of these objections, Chafee found only the first
to be very serious, and he concurred with the Commission in urging
that the right of reply should be carefully considered as an alterna125
tive remedy.
To this end, Chafee outlined a procedure which adapted the
French and German right of reply statutes to American conditions. 128 Rather than the right to automatic publication of a reply to
117. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 68, at 172-95.
118. Id. at 190-95.
119. The Commission on the Freedom of the Press was an independent, nongovernment
group operating under a grant to the University of Chicago by Time, Inc. and Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc. It was created to "consider the freedom, functions, and responsibilities of the
major agencies of mass communication in our time." Id. at iv.
120. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 3-35 (1941) (Chafee's general theory of free speech).
121. See Z. CHAFEE, supra note 68, at 178.
122. Id. at 179.
123. Id. at 180.
124. Id. at 180-82.
125. Id. at 183-84.
126. Id. at 190-95.
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any mention of one's name, the proposed reply would be submitted
to a judge who would pass on its decency and grammar and thereupon order it printed. 127 If the publisher conceded the truth of the
reply, a retraction could be published instead. 128 The judge could
limit the length of the reply and protect the newspaper from potential libel charges by third parties. 29 The details of these proposals
are somewhat dated now. Indeed, Chafee stressed the prior imporand objective comtance of developing a greater dedication to honest
30
community.
the
and
press
the
in
munication
Enactment of a statutory right of reply would have to contend
with a strong trend in the judicial system against the press. The argument for the right to reply did not prevail in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.'a' There the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the claim of a candidate for public office who sought to have
the Herald print his reply to a critical editorial. 132 Although the
Florida Supreme Court, pursuant to Florida's right of reply statute,
ruled in favor of the candidate, arguing that the statute enhanced
rather than inhibited public discussion, Chief Justice Burger condemned the law as empowering government to tell papers what to
print. 133 Justice Brennan, concurring, reserved judgment on whether
the Herald might be required to issue a retraction. 34
It may be argued that the issue of a right to reply on radio or
television differs from such a right with respect to the print media,
127. Id. at 193-94.
128. Id. at 194-95.
129. Id. at 192-94.
130. Id. at 195.
131. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Supreme Court had upheld the right of reply on the
radio in Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), in which the Commis-

sion had ordered a radio station to give equal time to a writer who had been the object of an
adverse comment on the air. But see CBS Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94

(1973), in which the Court disallowed an FCC order requiring CBS to air Democratic editorial advertising purporting to counter opposing views. Brennan and Marshall dissented in CBS,

holding that government action in such a case could enhance freedom of communication. Id. at
170.
132.

The Florida statute, quoted in Miami Herald, provided "that if a candidate for

nomination or election is assailed regarding his personal character or official record by any
newspaper, the candidate has the right to demand that the newspaper print, free of cost to the

candidate, any reply the candidate may make to the newspaper's charges." 418 U.S. at 244
(citing

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 104.38 (West 1973)). The reply was to be printed "in the same kind

of type as the charges which prompted the reply, provided it [did] not take up more space than
the charges." Failure to comply was a first-degree misdemeanor. Id.
133. 418 U.S. at 256-58.

134. Id. at 258.
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and that the issue in libel actions is still something else.13 5 There are
indeed significant differences in the availability of the information
which the public needs. The crucial question is that of access for
reply through alternative channels. In libel proceedings, the media
involved are the logical proximate channels; when newspaper reports
are at issue, there may be other newspapers whichocan provide the
requisite equal access. But it must be conceded that the press, like
the broadcast media, has become increasingly concentrated in ownership and operation. The point is not to balance the government's
power against that of the press, but rather to employ the government
so as to help the press be fully responsive to the public's need. When
government helps individuals to reply to other individuals, it seems
irrelevant to insist that we must "keep government off people's
backs."
Similar issues are now being debated in the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and outside it, over whether the Commission should alter the fairness doctrine under which, according to
Congressional action in 1959, the Commission requires broadcasters
to present opposing views on important public policies. 136 The present Commission chief, Mark Fowler, and the distinguished first
amendment lawyer, Floyd Abrams, oppose the fairness doctrine; government, they say, should not participate actively in regulating the
air waves.' 37 Other arguments against the doctrine are based on the
multiplicity of radio and television channels as contrasted with the
relative scarcity of newspapers, which are not subject to the fairness
rule. On the other hand, support for the rule also is strong both in
Congress and among former FCC members, such as Charles Ferris,
who headed the Commission under President Carter. The FCC, according to Ferris, does no more under the rule than to advise broadan unbalance in the listener's rights that
casters that there has been
38
corrected.1
be
to
needs
The theory of public speech which has been the central theme
of this Article comes down firmly on the side of maintaining the fairness rule in substantially its present form. As Ferris points out, the
FCC does not regulate content - it extends only to the form of
135. Barron, Access to the Press- A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641, 1668-78 (1967).
136. Kaplan, FairnessDoctrine in Broadcasting,N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1985, at C25, col.

4.
137.

Id.

138.

Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss3/3

20

Meiklejohn: Public Speech and Libel Litigation: Are They Compatible?
1986]

PUBLIC SPEECH AND LIBEL LITIGATION

public discussion. As to the more general complaint against regulation, it is difficult to understand why the enforcement of the fairness
rule is more regulatory than the judicial control of expression
through laws which punish libel and obscenity. 139 A broadcaster like
CBS might well prefer to allow General Westmoreland adequate
time to reply (indeed, CBS seems to have offered that throughout
the long trial) 140 than to be subject to the exhausting and costly burdens of libel litigation. As for the contention that an adequate multiplicity of radio and television channels are available for all views to
have access to the public, it is simply not the case that there are
more than a handful in the major cities. The rivalry of the networks
does not work with notable success to present opposing views. Furthermore, the fact that newspapers have been free from fairness restrictions in the past should not, given the increasingly noncompetitive status of the print media, preclude serious consideration of some
form of fairness or right-to-reply legislation.
V.

CONCLUSION

In the fall of 1979, Justice Brennan delivered a speech concerning the strain between the press and the Court over first amendment
guarantees of a free press.141 At that time, the press was deeply concerned over recent Supreme Court decisions denying editors and re1 42
porters the right to refuse to identify their sources of information.
In attempting to mitigate the animosity between the press and the
Court, Justice Brennan identified two models which he believes operative in press activities today. The "speech model" assures the press
protection for anything published; the "structural model" calls for
the adjustment of press activity to "other societal interests.' 43 The
latter model, which Justice Brennan favors, calls for restricting the
press in favor of other societal interests in both the gathering of news
and the nondisclosure of sources of information. In principle, Justice
Brennan urged the press to forego the "absoluteness" of the speech
model - that is, of a "personal" right to expression; rather, he ar139. See Abrams, supra note 113, at 34 (concerning the unpublishability of an important paper on medical research, because of the prospect of a libel suit).
140. A General Surrenders, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at A22 (Editorials), col. 1.
141. Address by William J. Brennan, Jr., 32 RUTGERS L. Rcv. 173 (1979) (advance
text of speech delivered on Oct. 17, 1979, at Rutgers University) [hereinafter Brennan Address]. See also Waggoner, Brennan ProtestsCriticism by Press, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1979,
at B6, col. 2.
142. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
143. Brennan Address, supra note 141, at 176.
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gued, the press should be concerned with protecting the social functions of impersonal dimensions.'
The freedom of the press to fulfill its communication function
does not per se involve persons. One hopes that such freedom will not
injure or distress the individuals about whom it reports. But, as Justice Brennan aptly quotes Lord Acton: "Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice."'" Perhaps our confidence
in full publicity is misplaced, but as long as we hold to that confidence we must expect damage to reputations and feelings. As Judge
Edgerton said more than twenty years before Times v. Sullivan,
"[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field of
46
free debate.'
I am uncertain whether Justice Brennan would regard the combination of absolute privilege and the right of reply as conforming to
one of his two models. But I believe that such a combination would
satisfy the requirements of the "structural model" in that both press
freedom and individual reputation are afforded protection. The most
frequently voiced criticism of the right to reply, i.e., that the reply
never catches up with the original story, seems valid only in a measure inversely proportional to the attentiveness and reflectiveness of
the audience or readers. It seems reasonable to hope that conclusions
based on adverse comment about individuals, especially those who
are prominent in society, will be held in suspense until both sides
have been heard. A free press cannot be fully responsible unless its
readers or listeners also are responsible. As Chafee said in his sug
gestions for a right-to-reply statute, the "chief cure for falsehoods in
mass communications should be sought outside the realm of law
.... Somehow the community must make the newspaper want to
147
be better."'
The award of attorney's fees, noted at the beginning of this Article, may have considerable merit in reducing the likelihood of press
self-censorship. But the right-of-reply remedy seems better calculated to insure, without heavy financial burdens on either side, a reconciliation of the press perspective with a matching presentation of
the situation by those who find themselves and their causes misrepresented. Such a resolution would not involve prescriptions as to the
144.
145.
146.
(1942).
147.

Id. at 177.
Id. at 182.
Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678
Z. CHAFEE, supra note 68, at 195.
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substance of what the press chooses to report. It would simply insure
that anyone written or spoken about would have the chance to reply.14 8 The American legal system should be able to work out equitably a method of achieving such a resolution. In a comment reported
at the end of the Westmoreland-CBS litigation, Marc Franklin of
the Stanford Law School said:
Not everyone who comes in off the street should be given equal
time, but the proper treatment in cases where truth and falsity are
murky and there is a morass of contradictory testimony is to let the
plaintiff state his perceptions .... This was a case for more free
speech, not for a lawsuit.' 49

148. See Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA.
L. REv. 867 (1948); Note, supra note 113.
149. Margolick, Risks in Litigation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at B7, col. 1.
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